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PRAGMATIC EXISTENTIALISM IN A POST-NEWTONIAN WORLD 
ISAAK DORE* 
INTRODUCTION 
For the last 3000 years Western philosophy has had an uneasy relationship 
with the methods of thought and investigation in natural science, mostly 
physics.  Yet physics and philosophy represent two tracks of a single human 
endeavor—that of comprehending man’s material and moral environment.  A 
different metaphor would describe physics and philosophy as opposite sides of 
the same coin.  Regardless of metaphor, however, there is no doubt that each 
discipline has advanced in tandem even if the degree of consensus achieved at 
any given historical period has not been the same. 
The first section of this essay presents the two-fold thesis that advances in 
natural science have influenced social philosophy and that these influences 
have been largely (though not exclusively) unidirectional.  The section justifies 
this thesis by tracing its origin.  Why did the scientific advances 3000 years ago 
influence social science?  How did this influence manifest itself?  The second 
section examines the nature of this dynamic.  What have been the 
consequences for philosophy given this dynamic?  Has this influence been 
progressive or regressive?  To what extent has post-Enlightenment physics 
undermined the philosophic doctrines based on pre-Enlightenment science? 
The first section will demonstrate that, as the early Greeks speculated 
about nature and reality, in short, about man’s material world, there was a 
natural human impulse to speculate about man’s moral world as well.  Given 
this tendency, it was natural to think that the latter was as knowable as the 
former.  A brief outline of pertinent pre-Socratic thought will be presented, 
showing the early dynamics of the relation between physics and philosophy, 
and how it influenced post-Socratic philosophy and philosophic thought during 
the Enlightenment.  The first section also explores the nature of the dynamic 
between physics and philosophy, namely, the extent to which post-
Enlightenment physics has undermined philosophic doctrines based on pre-
Enlightenment science.  For example, how have scientific advances in the post-
Newtonian era (such as quantum mechanics, Einstein’s theory of relativity, and 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) undermined traditional Enlightenment era 
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doctrines such as subject/object distinction, objectivity in texts, the doctrine of 
a metaphysical reality beyond the senses, the Platonic body/soul distinction, 
and the Cartesian mind/body distinction?  These and related questions will be 
examined in light of thinkers within the disciplines of science and philosophy, 
namely David Hume (whose pragmatism inspired the title of this essay), 
Werner Heisenberg, David Bohm, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. 
I.  PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: ORIGIN OF THE DYNAMIC 
The inquiry begins several hundred years before the pre-Socratic period.  
This is the time when the great Greek poets and playwriters such as Homer, 
Hesiod, and Sophocles lived between the eighth and fifth centuries BCE.  
Their writings showed an awareness of a higher and normatively superior 
moral law, but its existence was sought to be proved through drama and 
tragedy rather than through any sophisticated social or moral theory.1 
The pre-Socratic thinkers, however, were the first intellectual movement in 
the West to break with explanations of man’s material world based on myth 
and superstition.2  Beginning with Thales in 625 BCE,3 all of these thinkers 
tried to reach for some fundamental principle or theory that could provide a 
unified explanation of nature and reality: What is reality?  Why is the world (or 
nature) the way it is?  How is change explainable?  The effort to provide 
answers to these questions about the natural world on the basis of reason and 
logic rather than myth and superstition was itself an epistemological advance.4 
However, some of the early Greeks made a second epistemological leap 
still within their rationalist paradigm.  This was in taking the first step toward 
seeking knowledge of purely human affairs.5  If the laws of nature were 
knowable, were “out there” awaiting discovery by the human mind, must not 
there also be “natural” laws governing human conduct and human affairs?  
Could they not also be similarly discovered?  If there is only one distinct and 
correct answer to any question pertaining to the laws of physics, do not moral 
questions admit of single (and correct) answers?  This phenomenon is the 
conflation of physical laws with moral law.  The trend began with the laws of 
 
 1. See generally, Sophocles, Antigone, in TEN GREEK PLAYS 51, 64–65 (Lane Cooper & 
H.B. Densmore eds., Robert Whitelaw trans., 1936) (demonstrating the conflict between secular 
and divine sources of law). 
 2. See JONATHAN BARNES, 1 THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS 3–4 (1979). 
 3. ISAAK DORE, THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW, at xvii (2007). 
 4. See BARNES, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
 5. See id. at 6–7. 
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nature expressed in terms of social and moral norms and, later, with a reverse 
transposition, moral and social norms were expressed simply as “natural law.”6 
The thought of three pre-Socratic thinkers is relevant in this regard.  The 
first is Anaximander (610–546 BCE) who, in addition to propounding an 
astoundingly realistic theory of the origin of the universe as having emerged 
from a fiery ball that expanded outwards,7 took the first step in the direction of 
expressing the laws of nature in moralistic terms.  According to the following 
fragment attributed to Simplicius: 
Anaximander . . . said that . . . the things from which is the coming into being 
for the things that exist are also those into which their destruction comes about, 
in accordance with what must be. . . . For they give justice (diké) and 
reparation to one another for their offence (adikia) in accordance with the 
ordinance of time . . .8 
The second pre-Socratic philosopher who conflated the laws of nature with 
moral law was Heraclitus (c. 540–480 BCE).9  He espoused the notion that the 
phusis, or essential nature of natural phenomena, was explainable in terms of a 
single metatheory or “account” (logos).10  Natural science also had a distinctly 
moral content, as exemplified by the following fragments by Heraclitus: 
Thinking is common to all.11 
It belongs to all people to know themselves and to think rightly.12 
Men who are lovers of wisdom must be inquirers into many things indeed.13 
Wisdom is one thing, to be skilled in true judgment, how all things are steered 
through all things.14 
Right thinking is the greatest excellence, and wisdom is to speak the truth and 
act in accordance with nature, while paying attention to it.15 
 
 6. For a discussion of the ancient sources which underlie the works of early natural law 
theorist Thomas Aquinas, see generally Jan A. Aertsen, Aquinas’s Philosophy in its Historical 
Setting, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS 12–37 (Norman Kretzmann & Eleonore 
Stump eds., 1993). 
 7. JAMES N. JORDAN, WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 8–10 (1987). 
 8. BARNES, supra note 2, at 29 (quoting Simplicius) (emphasis added). 
 9. THE PRESOCRATICS 64 (Philip Wheelwright ed., 1966). 
 10. Id. at 58–60 (“Listening not to me but to my account it is wise to agree that everything is 
one.”). 
 11. RICHARD D. MCKIRAHAN, JR., PHILOSOPHY BEFORE SOCRATES 119 (1994) (presenting 
several translated fragments from the work of Heraclitus). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 120. 
 15. Id. 
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For this reason it is necessary to follow what is common.  But although the 
LOGOS is common, most people live as if they had their own private 
understanding.16 
What understanding (NOOS) or intelligence (PHREN) have they?  They put their 
trust in popular bards and take the mob for their teacher, unaware that most 
people are bad, and few are good.17 
One ought not to act and speak like people asleep.18 
The above fragments are representative of the view of nature in moralistic 
terms, a trend which culminated in the notion that moral truths are just as 
eternal as natural truths.  The key ideas in the above fragments are “right” 
thinking, love of wisdom, grasp of the logos, and “good” and “bad” persons, 
the former being those who possess true judgment/wisdom, and the latter being 
those who do not.  These ideas inspired the two great post-Socratic 
philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, to undertake the philosophical quest for what 
is the best life and ultimate goal for a person.19  According to Heraclitus, all 
persons must strive to grasp the logos and its underlying truth.20  Plato and 
Aristotle similarly answered the question by asserting that the pursuit of truth 
and wisdom should be the highest goal of life, i.e., that the highest virtue was 
intellectual in nature.21 
Parmenides (c. 515–450 BCE)22 continued the quest for truth in a famous 
poem, part of which is dedicated to the “Way of Truth.”23  In it, he described 
truth as trustworthy rational discourse.24  Equally important was Parmenides’ 
assertion that there exists a permanent and unified reality.25  This reality is, 
according to Parmenides, unchanging, because “Justice has permitted it . . . 
neither to come to be nor to perish, relaxing her shackles, but holds <it> 
fast.”26  This is another example of a conflation of natural laws with moral law, 
reminiscent of Anaximander’s metaphysical account of “justice and 
reparation” between natural events showing destruction and regeneration.27 
 
 16. MCKIRAHAN, supra note 11, at 116. 
 17. Id. at 117. 
 18. Id. at 118. 
 19. See Catherine Osborne, Heraclitus, in 1 FROM THE BEGINNING TO PLATO 89 (C.C.W. 
Taylor ed., 1997) (noting that Heraclitus inspired Plato). 
 20. Id. at 88, 96. 
 21. DORE, supra note 3, at 152–53, 157–59, 207–08, 210–11. 
 22. THE PRESOCRATICS, supra note 9, at 91–92. 
 23. BARNES, supra note 2, at 155–56. 
 24. See MCKIRAHAN, supra note 11, at 151; The Way of Truth, in THE PRESOCRATICS, 
supra note 9, at 96–98. 
 25. See MCKIRAHAN, supra note 11, at 151–55. 
 26. Id. at 153–54. 
 27. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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It is beyond the scope of our inquiry to examine the thought of the other 
pre-Socratic philosophers.  The three mentioned above were chosen because 
they expressed the laws of nature through moralistic notions which history 
shows led to the eventual claim that moral rules (like physical laws) had a 
permanent and eternal existence and were therefore, above all, knowable. 28  
These philosophers also claimed that physical reality not only existed 
independently of the mind, but could be explained in terms of objective truths.  
As noted above, both notions influenced Western philosophical thought, 
beginning with Plato and continuing through the Enlightenment project.29 
Thus Plato postulated the distinction between the body and the soul, only 
the latter having access to permanent knowledge of unchanging reality 
represented by the forms.30  René Descartes, one of the earlier figures of the 
Enlightenment, also tried to construct a philosophical system that would yield 
fundamental knowledge.31  In his Discourse on the Method and Meditations on 
First Philosophy he put forward his method of doubt and logical reasoning that 
he hoped would lead to a new philosophical system that would guarantee 
knowledge.32  His method of doubt questioned everything, including his own 
existence.33  On the latter question of his own existence, however, he came to 
his famous conclusion: cogito ergo sum, which claimed that he could not doubt 
his existence due to the very fact that he was thinking.34 
Having established the res cogitans (the thinking self), Descartes 
contrasted it with res extensa, the external world beyond the senses.35  
Descartes posited that there was such a reality and the challenge was simply 
that of gaining knowledge of it.36  Descartes thus substituted the mind/body 
distinction in place of Plato’s body/soul distinction.  Both distinctions were, 
however, dedicated to the identical claim that a metaphysical reality beyond 
the senses really did exist and that it could be the object of knowledge. 
 
 28. See supra notes 5–21 and accompanying text. 
 29. See DORE, supra note 3, at 295 (discussing the influence of Plato and Aristotle’s theories 
on Western thought). 
 30. PLATO, PHAEDO 186–87 (C.J. Rowe ed., 1993); PLATO, TIMAEUS 56 (H.D.P. Lee trans., 
1965); see generally DAVID J. MELLING, UNDERSTANDING PLATO 96–113 (1987); Robert 
Heinaman, Plato: Metaphysics and Epistemology, in 1 FROM THE BEGINNING TO PLATO, supra 
note 19, at 356, 360. 
 31. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in DESCARTES: SELECTED 
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, 73 at 76 (John Cottingham et al. trans., 1988) [hereinafter Descartes, 
Meditations]. 
 32. Id. at 20, 21, 76. 
 33. Descartes, Meditations, supra note 31, at 127. 
 34. Id. at 80. 
 35. See DORE, supra note 3, at 315 n.47. 
 36. See René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in DESCARTES: SELECTED 
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, supra note 31, at 164, 189. 
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Although the rationalist paradigm of Ancient Greece dominated pre- and 
post-Socratic philosophical thought—and beyond—it was bound to crumble.  
The onslaught of scientific advances in gaining knowledge of the nature of 
reality and the methods and means of providing such knowledge made it 
evident that man could not live on reason alone and that experimentation and 
observation were indispensable in achieving scientific progress.37  As if on cue, 
major figures within the Enlightenment period swung behind empiricism.  
Experience rather than reason thus became central to the philosophical thought 
of Hobbes, Hume, Berkeley, and Descartes.38 
The main purpose of the above sketch is to outline the pre-Socratic origins 
of the claim that advances in natural science influenced claims to knowledge in 
social science.  Indeed, pre-Socratic philosophy made four separate claims: 
First, that the natural world was knowable; second, that the natural world could 
be understood in moral terms; third, that man’s moral world could be 
understood in natural terms; and fourth, that both moral laws and natural laws 
were knowable.39  Ever since that time, Western philosophy, whether during 
the period of the Ancients or during the period of the Enlightenment, has 
labored under the influence of these claims in one form or another.  While 
there are notable exceptions (as seen below), the philosophical linkages 
between the natural and social sciences show that the moving force in social 
science was the development of natural science and not the other way around. 
A. Nature of the Dynamic 
The above section sketched how science influenced philosophy.  The 
influence was both progressive and regressive.  The present section examines 
the negative/regressive aspects of this influence.  More specifically, it 
examines the extent to which post-Enlightenment physics has undermined 
philosophic doctrines based on pre-Enlightenment science.  It shows that while 
doctrines such as the subject/object distinction, the claim of objectivity, the 
existence of a metaphysical reality independent of the senses, the body/soul 
distinction, the mind/body distinction, etc., have been severely undermined—if 
not discredited entirely—philosophy (and science) have not been left in such 
disarray as to prevent humans from flourishing in both the scientific and 
 
 37. See generally THOMAS L. HANKINS, SCIENCE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 1–16 (1985) 
(discussing scientific advances and the new importance placed upon observation during the 
Enlightenment). 
 38. See generally JAMES COLLINS, THE BRITISH EMPIRICISTS: LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME 
(1987); David Fate Norton, David Hume, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE MODERN 
PHILOSOPHERS 148, 149–53 (Steven M. Emmanuel ed., 2001) (discussing the empiricism of 
Hume in the context of Hobbes and Berkeley).  It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to pursue 
these developments.  It suffices to note that the epistemological shifts in natural science had a 
definite impact on philosophical inquiry and that this impact was largely unidirectional. 
 39. DORE, supra note 3, at 13, 37. 
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social/philosophic contexts.  What is remarkable about this conclusion is that it 
draws support from the philosophic as well as the scientific community, as 
represented by David Hume, Werner Heisenberg, David Bohm, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, and Hans-Georg Gadamer.  The thought of each of these 
philosophers is examined within the limitations of the inquiry set forth above. 
II.  THE PROBABILISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY OF DAVID HUME 
It is perhaps appropriate to begin with a brief discussion of a major figure 
of the Enlightenment era itself, namely David Hume.  Only that part of Hume’s 
philosophy that is relevant to the topic under discussion is presented here. 
Hume was of the belief that all human understanding consisted of the 
search for the relations which objects and events bear to one other.40  Hume 
thus divided human understanding into “relations of ideas” and “matters of 
fact” propositions.41  The former are self-evident or intuitive propositions, 
whose denial of the predicate in the relation would result in a contradiction; 
examples of “relations of ideas” include 2 + 2 = 4, “lead is metal,” “bachelors 
are unmarried,” etc.42  They do not have any bearing on what exists or does not 
exist.  Matters of fact propositions, on the other hand, do have existential 
import and their denial does not lead to a contradiction, such as the idea that 
“the sun will rise tomorrow.”43  Unlike relations of ideas, matters of fact 
propositions can be verified by observation and experience, or by inductive 
inferences.44  Furthermore, unlike relations of ideas, one cannot have 
demonstrative knowledge of matters of fact propositions: 
That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and 
implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise.  We 
should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.  Were it 
demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be 
distinctly conceived by the mind.45 
In other words, in mathematics one has demonstration, but in the empirical 
sciences one has “causal” inference, which is ultimately validated by 
experience.  Hume indeed attacks the common belief that everything that exists 
must have a cause.46  The proposition, he argues, is circular and begs the 
 
 40. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND 
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 23–24 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 3d ed., Open University Set 
Book 1975) (1777) [hereinafter HUME, ENQUIRIES]. 
 41. Id. at 25. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. at 25–26. 
 44. Id. 
 45. HUME, ENQUIRIES supra note 40, at 25–26. 
 46. See id. at 73 (“We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all 
the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived.”). 
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question by assuming the very thing that needs to be proven, namely, that 
anything that begins to exist must have a cause.47  It cannot, therefore, be 
proved by reason.  It is thus experience and not reason that shows the relation 
of cause and effect, and it is through this relation that one can understand the 
world, including the world that exists “beyond the present testimony of our 
senses.”48  For example, one cannot experience today that the sun will rise 
tomorrow.  But repeated observation of the phenomenon leads to the belief that 
the sun will rise tomorrow.  Yet this is merely an inference or belief, incapable 
of proof through reason.  Because of the “constant conjunction” of events and 
their attendant consequences, the mind simply develops a habit or custom of 
drawing inferences, such as the notion that the future will resemble the past (as 
in the example of the sun rising tomorrow).49 
Regularity in causal connections creates memories of previous instances 
and leads to customary expectations that “instances, of which we have had no 
experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that 
the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.”50  Yet the 
presupposition that the future will resemble the past and that nature will remain 
uniform is neither intuitively certain nor is it susceptible of demonstrative 
proof; it is only a belief.51  According to Hume, one cannot prove the validity 
of the causal inference by a principle that cannot itself be proved or is not 
intuitively certain or demonstrable.52 
In conclusion, Hume’s argument may be summarized as follows: (1) The 
characteristics of the physical world is a question of fact; (2) questions of fact 
require experience to be answered; (3) our experience is limited to the 
perceived world only; (4) therefore, we cannot know the physical world—it is 
unknown and unknowable; (5) hence, we should adopt skepticism as to the 
characteristics of the physical world. 
The principles of uniformity and of the future resembling the past would 
seem to suggest that the external world exists independently of the senses.  On 
 
 47. See id. at 62–79 (arguing that we may infer that one event causes another only after 
experiencing the “necessary connexion” between the cause and effect). 
 48. Id. at 26. 
 49. Id. at 78 (“But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always 
followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion.”). 
 50. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 89 (P.H. Nidditch & L.A. Selby-Bigge 
eds., 2d ed. 1978) (1739) [hereinafter HUME, A TREATISE].  But see Robert J. Fogelin, Hume’s 
Skepticism, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUME 90, 95 (David Fate Norton, ed., 1999) 
(contrasting demonstrative reasoning with reasoning involving probability). 
 51. See David Hume, An Abstract of a Book Lately Published; Entituled A TREATISE OF 
HUMAN NATURE, &c. Wherein the Chief Argument of that Book is Farther Illustrated and 
Explained, in DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 50, at  651 (“All 
probable arguments are built on the supposition, that there is this conformity betwixt the future 
and the past, and therefore can never prove it.”). 
 52. See id. 
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the other hand, Hume’s theory teaches us that the mind has access to this 
external world only through perception; it does not and cannot have access to 
the external world independently of perception.53  To the extent that the mind 
does have such access, Hume’s theory of custom as guide for life insists that a 
probabilistic world is sufficient for human flourishing.  Hume does not adopt 
skepticism in its most radical sense.  Indeed, the following statement by Hume 
is a good example of his existential pragmatism.  Notwithstanding his 
skepticism, he asserts, he still likes to play backgammon, dine with his friends, 
and be merry! 
I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my 
friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these 
speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot 
find in my heart to enter into them any farther.54 
A. Hume on the Self 
Finally, Hume’s empiricism also led him to deny the existence of an 
objective self.55  Here Hume’s views on personal identity have an almost 
postmodern ring and accord with the teachings of quantum theory.56  So radical 
was his empiricism that it led him to assert that even experience cannot 
confirm the existence of the self.57  One’s personal identity, according to 
Hume, cannot exist apart from the various impressions and perceptions that 
suffuse the human mind: 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure.  I never can catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.58 
In other words, Hume could never separate his personal identity from his 
perceptions, and this led him to place the existence of the former firmly in 
question.  Building upon this introspective observation, Hume also observed 
that this “bundle or collection of different perceptions” which composed his 
 
 53. See HUME, ENQUIRIES, supra note 40, at 18–19 (dividing perceptions between ideas and 
impressions and asserting that experience is the only vehicle for accessing the external world). 
 54. HUME, A TREATISE, supra note 50, at 269. 
 55. See id. at 253–59. 
 56. See J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the 
Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 106–7, 112–13, 175–76 (1994) (providing a 
postmodern perspective on the study of the law); DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE 
IMPLICATE ORDER 143 (1980) (describing quantum theory). 
 57. HUME, A TREATISE, supra note 50, at 252. 
 58. Id. 
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mind “succeed[ed] each other with an inconceivable rapidity” and were “in a 
perpetual flux and movement.”59  This led Hume to theorize that: 
The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successfully make 
their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of 
postures and situations.  There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor 
identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that 
simplicity and identity.”60 
The lack of a constant and identifiable state of “self” led Hume to conclude 
“that identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and 
uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, 
because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon 
them.”61 
As seen later, this view of the subject as merging with the object (i.e., that 
which is perceived) has great appeal to postmodern thinking.  Instead of the 
subject understanding an object and giving the latter meaning, it is the object 
that gives meaning to the subject.  Since perceptions differ, Hume’s thinking 
seems to deny not only “objective” meanings given by the subject, but it also 
seems to admit a measure of relativism in ascribing meaning.  Nevertheless, 
neither Hume’s thoroughgoing empiricism nor his moderate skepticism 
“should ever undermine the reasonings of common life.”62 
III.  THE PROBABILISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY OF WERNER HEISENBERG 
The historical context in which Heisenberg wrote witnessed a breakdown 
in the attainment of complete objective truth in the scientific realm.63  This 
occurred with the onset of quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, and 
Heisenberg’s own Uncertainty Principle.64  Quantum mechanics undermined 
the classical Newtonian view that atoms objectively occupied a certain position 
in space.65  It held that matter at the subatomic level did not exist precisely at a 
certain location, but it only showed “‘tendencies to exist.’”66  Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle held that the more precisely the position of a subatomic 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 253. 
 61. Id. at 260. 
 62. HUME, ENQUIRIES, supra note 40, at 41. 
 63. See JAMES T. CUSHING, QUANTUM MECHANICS 25 (David L. Hull ed., 1994) (describing 
the standard, or Copenhagen, interpretation of quantum mechanics as undermining the existence 
of an “objective, observer-independent reality”). 
 64. See Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise 
of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 436–39 (1987). 
 65. See id. at 437–38. 
 66. Id. at 438 (quoting F. CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 68 (1975)). 
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particle (such as an electron) is determined the less precisely its momentum is 
known, and vice-versa.67 
Despite the apparent breakdown in the scientist’s ability to determine 
objective truth, Heisenberg argued that objective truth was not a precondition 
in science.68  He did so by distinguishing between “practical realism” and 
“dogmatic realism.” 
We ‘objectivate’ a statement if we claim that its content does not depend on 
the conditions under which it can be verified.  Practical realism assumes that 
there are statements that can be objectivated and that in fact the largest part of 
our experience in daily life consists of such statements.  Dogmatic realism 
claims that there are no statements concerning the material world that cannot 
be objectivated.  Practical realism has always been and will always be an 
essential part of natural science. . . . It is only through quantum theory that we 
have learned that exact science is possible without the basis of dogmatic 
realism.69 
Thus, even though the classical theories of physics broke down in the face of 
the discoveries of the twentieth century,70 physicists could rest easy because 
meaning (i.e., exact science) could still be determined through reliance upon 
the scientific method in the new probabilistic physical world.71 
The shift from a Newtonian/Cartesian paradigm of nature has given way to 
a post-Einsteinian physics that views reality as an undifferentiated whole in 
which we are situated as participants rather than as observers.72  As 
participants, we interact, if not “interfere,” with nature.73  But, to paraphrase 
Bohm,74 once we accept that the “interference” with experimental conditions 
affects the “potentialities” of nature, we already seem committed to the view 
that there is a reality under study.  What that reality is, and how we can 
understand it, whether that understanding can be complete and final, whether 
what understanding we have is of any use to us, are, of course, separate 
questions.  It is quite apparent that Heisenberg can live within a probabilistic 
universe.  Indeed, he explicitly states that the result of quantum theory is that 
“[n]atural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is a part of 
the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to 
our method of questioning.”75  This possibility never occurred to Descartes;76 
 
 67. See MILIČ ČAPEK, THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS 292–93 
(1961). 
 68. WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY 82 (Harper Torchbook 1962) (1958). 
 69. Id. at 81–82. 
 70. See Williams, supra note 64, at 436–37. 
 71. See HEISENBERG, supra note 68, at 82. 
 72. See CUSHING, supra note 63, at 25. 
 73. See BOHM, supra note 56, at 143. 
 74. See id. 
 75. HEISENBERG, supra note 68, at 81. 
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therefore, this interplay makes a clean separation between mind and body 
impossible.  But it also means that truth need not be final. 
It is the Cartesian partition of mind and body that has led many, including 
eminent scientists like Einstein, to resist this fusion of the observer and the 
phenomena he is observing.77  This partition has penetrated human thought so 
thoroughly that it has persisted for three centuries, and Heisenberg predicts that 
it will take time to erode.78  Its central claim regarding the res extensa, as seen 
above, is that a metaphysical reality beyond the senses really does exist.79  
Heisenberg characterizes this claim as “metaphysical realism.”80  Thus while 
metaphysical realism may, in most cases, resemble dogmatic realism, 
Heisenberg’s argument is that not just ordinary life, but scientific discourse as 
well, can flourish on the basis of only practical realism.81 
A similar approach is taken by David Bohm.  Indeed, taking a step beyond 
Heisenberg, Bohm argues that scientific knowledge is no longer the only 
legitimate source of understanding.82  The latter can be acquired in ways that 
go beyond the limits of science.  Bohm argues that the theory of relativity and 
quantum theory have greatly undermined our sense of scientists as neutral 
observers.83  He suggests that “both observer and observed are merging and 
interpenetrating aspects of one whole reality, which is indivisible and 
unanalysable.”84  He explains: 
As relativity and quantum theory have  shown that it has no meaning to divide 
the observing apparatus from what is observed, so the considerations discussed 
here indicate that it has no meaning to separate the observed fact (along with 
the instruments used to observe it) from the theoretical notions of order that 
help to give ‘shape’ to this fact. . . . Fact and theory are thus seen to be 
different aspects of one whole in which analysis into separate but interacting 
parts is not relevant. That is to say, not only is undivided wholeness implied in 
the content of physics (notably relativity and quantum theory) but also in the 
manner of working in physics.85 
 
 76. See DORE, supra note 3, at 315 n.47. 
 77. See CUSHING, supra note 63, at 25 (discussing Einstein’s aversion to fusing the observer 
and the observed phenomena). 
 78. HEISENBERG, supra note 68, at 81. 
 79. See supra notes 28–29, 36 and accompanying text. 
 80. HEISENBERG, supra note 68, at 81. 
 81. See id. at 81–82. 
 82. See BOHM, supra note 56, at 143. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. at 9. 
 85. Id. at 143. 
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A. Heisenberg on Language 
Heisenberg is of the view that despite the “intrinsic uncertainty of the 
meaning of words” language as a method of communication between humans 
contains concepts that can be used as tools for meaningfully ordering daily 
life.86  Almost in Humean terms, Heisenberg claims that when certain words 
are used repeatedly they acquire customary meanings.87  Thus, for example, 
one can speak of “a piece of iron” or “a piece of wood,” but one cannot speak 
of a “piece of water.”88  Thus customary expectations lead to the emergence of 
definitions which set boundaries of meaning.89 
Yet, language in natural science has a specialized communicative function, 
according to Heisenberg.90  He credits Aristotle for having created the basis for 
scientific language.91  Aristotelian logic examined “the forms of language, the 
formal structure of conclusions and deductions independent of their content.”92  
Scientific logic seeks to establish laws for deriving the particular from the 
general.93  But the general laws of science must contain very precise concepts 
which can only be achieved through mathematical abstraction.94  Heisenberg 
contrasts the language of science with the language of law.95  In the latter, he 
argues, “complete precision is not needed” and “definitions in terms of 
ordinary language are sufficient.”96  Despite the rigors of scientific discourse, 
however, it has been already seen that Heisenberg is content to let practical 
realism (as opposed to metaphysical or dogmatic realism) provide the 
conditions for scientific and legal discourse to flourish. 
Heisenberg’s views on language are similar to those of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein.  Wittgenstein asserted that just because one proposition about a 
particular concept is false, that does not necessitate the conclusion that other 
propositions about the same concept (or the meaning inherent in the concept 
itself) are also false.97  This concept was illustrated in Wittgenstein’s analysis 
of the name “Moses”: 
We may say, following [Bertrand] Russell: the name ‘Moses’ may be defined 
by means of various descriptions.  For example, as ‘the man who led the 
 
 86. HEISENBERG, supra note 68, at 168–69. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 168. 
 89. Id. at 169. 
 90. Id. at 171–72. 
 91. HEISENBERG, supra note 68, at 169. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 171. 
 94. Id. at 172. 
 95. Id. 
 96. HEISENBERG, supra note 68, at 172. 
 97. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 79 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 2001) (1953). 
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Israelites through the wilderness,’ ‘the man who lived at that time and place 
and was then called ‘Moses,’ ‘the man who as a child was taken out of the Nile 
by Pharaoh’s daughter’ and so on.  And according as we assume one definition 
or another the proposition ‘Moses did not exist’ acquires a different sense, and 
so does every other proposition about Moses. . . . But when I make a statement 
about Moses,—am I always ready to substitute some one of these descriptions 
for ‘Moses?’  I shall perhaps say: By ‘Moses’ I understand the man who did 
what the Bible relates of Moses, or at any rate a good deal of it.  But how 
much?  Have I decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my 
proposition as false?  Has the name ‘Moses’ got a fixed and unequivocal use 
for me in all possible cases?—Is it not the case that I have, so to speak, a 
whole series of props in readiness, and am ready to lean on one if another 
should be taken from under me, and vice versa?98 
Wittgenstein’s point in the above quotation is that language has flexible 
meanings and gives us a variety of props to convey it.  In the above example, if 
one of the characteristics about Moses is shown to be untrue this does not by 
itself entail the conclusion that Moses did not exist or did not do some or all of 
the other activities attributed to him.  The definition would then just shift to 
one containing the other attributes.  Thus, the concept of “Moses” would retain 
meaning even assuming the fallibility of one of the definitions proffered for his 
existence.99 
According to Wittgenstein, a particular concept’s meaning is not 
dependent on perfect clarity, but it can serve merely to remove or avert a 
misunderstanding.100  Thus his famous example that the phrase “stand roughly 
here,” though inexact, nonetheless serves as a meaningful concept in everyday 
life, depending on context.101  Indeed, for Wittgenstein, different contexts 
called for different meanings, so that no single meaning could account for 
every potential contextual contingency.102 
IV.  THE PROBABILISTIC ONTOLOGY OF GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS 
A parallel with the thought of Heisenberg and Bohm can be found in the 
philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer.  Inspired by Heidegger, Gadamer’s 
philosophy shows strong affinities with holistic quantum theory.103  He argued 
that interpretation is never an attitude of a subject projected in nature, but it is 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. ¶ 88. 
 101. Id. 
 102. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 137–41 (2d ed. 1969) (citing Wittgenstein for 
the proposition that language carries with it certain tacit understandings that need not be spelled 
out in every case). 
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in fact, something that “precedes and informs” subjectivity.104  In other words, 
“interpretation is not an activity, it is a mode of being-in-the-world.”105  This 
effectively rejects the idea that the individual subject is “a self-directing center 
of knowledge.”106 
Interpretation is just one mode of “being” in the world.  There are other 
ways of being that become evident as one examines the totality of existence.  
Hermeneutics is the study of the ways in which existence gives meaning to the 
world in which we live.107  In this sense, it is ontological.  Still though, the 
ontology is not presented as a grand or final narrative that is “superior” to all 
others.108  Indeed, it seeks to strike a compromise, or bridge the gap, between 
two opposing enquiries as to meaning in life.109  At one end of the pole is the 
claim of finality and objectivity (dogmatic/metaphysical realism) while at the 
other end is the charge of indeterminacy and subjectivity.110 
The hermeneutic approach seeks to move beyond the subjective/objective 
dichotomy and, in law, to find meaning in the legal text without total surrender 
to subjectivism.111  Gadamer’s hermeneutics focuses on how the meaning is 
revealed, or more generally, how the world reveals meaning to those who live 
in it.112 
In an approach reminiscent of Kant, who examined the conditions that 
made experience possible, Gadamer states his goal as not to propose a 
procedure of understanding, but rather, as “to clarify the conditions in which 
understanding takes place.”113  Also, just as the categories of cognition predate 
experience and are taken as given by Kant, the conditions that make 
interpretation in law possible are taken as given by Gadamer.  What, then, are 
these conditions?  These are the “prejudices and fore-meanings in the mind of 
the interpreter” (very much in the tradition of Heidegger).114  Second is the 
“effective-history” of the text.115  Gadamer urges the interpreter to transcend 
his own presuppositions and prejudices and take into account the historical 
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conditions of the text.116  Likewise, in any discourse, each party must try to 
understand “the otherness of the other.”117  Each side, then, will have its own 
“horizon” of understanding.118  There will therefore be an inevitable tension 
between the horizon of the text and that of its interpreter, each separated by a 
“temporal distance.”119 
Meaning is given through a fusion of the horizons or through bridging of 
the temporal gap.120  As noted above, however, no claim is made to its finality 
or superiority since all meanings are contingent and are constantly 
reappropriated and renewed: 
But the discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never 
finished; it is in fact an infinite process.  Not only are fresh sources of error 
constantly excluded, so that the true meaning has filtered out of it all kinds of 
things that obscure it, but there emerge continually new sources of 
understanding, which reveal unsuspected elements of meaning.121 
To explain further how understanding through the fusion of horizons takes 
place, Gadamer uses the notion of “play.”122  For example, a person examining 
a work of art will be “at play with [it]” before arriving at an aesthetic 
appreciation of it.123  Each presents a claim of meaning to the other; it is as if 
each “dance[s]” with the other in order to achieve something that neither 
would be able to do on its own.124  Yet each playful act has its rules of the 
game, depending on whether the artwork is a painting, a sculpture, a musical 
score, etc.125 
The same analogy applies to the interpreter and legal text.  Both reader and 
text are at play prior to arriving at an understanding.  Just as the dance between 
two persons renders a picture which neither dancer could present on his own, 
so the meaning that emerges from the fusion of horizons of the reader and text 
is a meaning that cannot belong solely to either the reader or the author of the 
text.126  Furthermore, like in any play, there is a measure of “risk.”127  The risk 
for the reader is that he may have to give up such presuppositions or 
preconceptions that he brings as part of his forestructure of meanings.128  It 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 270. 
 118. See id. at 267–74. 
 119. Id. at 266. 
 120. GADAMER, supra note 107, at 258–74. 
 121. Id. at 265–66. 
 122. Id. at 91–119. 
 123. Mootz, supra note 111, at 531–32. 
 124. Id. at 532. 
 125. Id. at 533. 
 126. GADAMER, supra note 107, at 350. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] PRAGMATIC EXISTENTIALISM IN A POST-NEWTONIAN WORLD 1293 
must also be mentioned that, as noted in the analogy with Kant above, 
Gadamer was concerned with the conditions that make meaning emerge.  Thus 
the play that occurs is not an act of will or purpose; it instead occurs naturally 
(i.e., it is given).129  In other words, just as the human mind is hardwired with 
the categories of cognition that make experience possible, human beings are 
also programmed to be ontologically playful.  As part of the process of playful 
fusion, the reader will first approach the text at a precognitive level.  He will 
then impose a preliminary meaning to the text.  Next, he will revise it after 
further examination and reflection.  He will subsequently consider alternative 
meanings and, finally, will settle on one meaning for the case before him.130 
Very much in the Humean tradition, man, as hermeneutical being, is 
always interpreting.131  Even the primordial act of first perception is itself an 
interpretive act.  All subsequent acts are second-order acts of interpretation.  If 
we try to consciously reflect on that first-order perception we realize only too 
late that it was itself an interpretation: 
When we understand a text, what is meaningful in it charms us just as the 
beautiful charms us. It has asserted itself and charmed us before we can come 
to ourselves and be in a position to test the claim to meaning that it makes. 
What we encounter in the experience of the beautiful and in understanding the 
meaning of tradition has effectively something about it of the truth of play. In 
understanding we are drawn into an event of truth and arrive, as it were, too 
late, if we want to know what we ought to believe.132 
In conclusion, it can be seen that Gadamer’s philosophy has strong 
affinities with holistic quantum theory.  In place of objective meaning or 
“dogmatic/metaphysical realism,” Gadamer’s hermeneutics advocates 
provisional and contingent meanings which are more akin to Heisenberg’s 
version of practical realism.133  This, in turn, means that the text, though 
indeterminate in any given instant, is not totally devoid of meaning.134  Thus, 
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even though there is a fusion of subject and object, Gadamar occupies the 
middle ground between indeterminacy and objectivity while at the same time 
claiming that this in no way prevents legal discourse from flourishing. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the relationship between epistemological shifts in 
natural science and their impact on social philosophy.  It is beyond question 
that there has been an impact.  The origins of these links were traced to the 
cradle of Western philosophy, eighth-century Greece BCE.135  This era was 
marked by a natural human impulse to seek certainty in man’s moral world in a 
way that reflected the certainty of his material world.136 
The burden of this Article was to explore the nature of the dynamic and to 
examine the extent to which advances in natural sciences have undermined not 
the old dogmas within the scientific discipline, but rather, the extent to which 
such advances undermined social philosophy.  That advances in natural science 
did undermine older dogmas within the scientific discipline is a self-evident 
truth and, as such, is of no epistemological import.  For that reason, it was not 
discussed here.  Given this truth, the more interesting question explored in this 
Article was the extent to which social philosophy has been buffeted by the 
currents of natural science. 
The epistemological balance sheet for social philosophy appears to be very 
much in positive territory despite the onslaught of scientific advances.  Why 
and how is this so?  Two main reasons were sketched above.  The first is that 
the potentially destabilizing effects of quantum theory, Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle, and Einstein’s theory of relativity did not bequeath onto 
us a world of scientific anarchy.  Indeed, Heisenberg himself rejected the 
notion that there are no statements about the material world that cannot be 
objectivated.137  He argued that quantum theory had, in fact, shown that 
scientific progress is possible without dogmatic realism.138  He also rejected 
Cartesian metaphysical realism which posited that a metaphysical reality really 
did exist independently of the senses.139  In place of both doctrines he 
advanced his preferred doctrine of practical realism, a realism which embraces 
a probabilistic epistemology and eschews certainty or infallibility.140  Even if 
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the dynamic between natural science and philosophy is understood as one of 
cause and effect, if practical realism rules within the scientific domain, it must 
also rule in the philosophic domain by analogy, if not by necessary 
implication.  The analog to “practical realism” in philosophy is what I call 
pragmatic existentialism. 
The second reason for the positive balance sheet is the modernistic currents 
of a pragmatic nature within philosophy itself.  Heisenberg is not the only one 
who advances the view that legal discourse can flourish even in the face of a 
certain measure of indeterminacy.  Bohm, Hume, Gadamar, and Wittgenstein 
complement his view.  They all adopt an approach which eschews objectivity 
in language and embraces contextualism and contingency.  The Gadamarian 
hermeneutic, with its twin notions of “play” and “fusion,” shows a strong 
affinity with holistic quantum theory, which, despite the fusion of subject and 
object, does not abjure the quest for meaning.  Hume’s far-sighted philosophy 
of the self achieves the same goal.  Hume’s critiques of reason and causality 
throw cold water on claims to knowledge of matters of fact, but Hume’s great 
principle of custom and the associative laws of the mind save mankind in the 
end.  Hume’s pragmatic existentialism is thus embraced by all philosophers 
discussed above. 
It is not without reason, then, that it is often said that the human condition 
is a profoundly Humean condition. 
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